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INTRODUCTION
There is increasing interest in biometric authentication for government security applications. Technologies such as automatic face recognition, fingerprint and iris identification are being implemented for government identification documents and surveillance [13] . Such use of biometrics has provoked increasing concern about the privacy and security implications of these technologies [3] . In this paper, the identifiability of stored biometric CCECE 2004 -CCGEI 2004 , Niagara Falls, May/mai 2004 /04/$17.00 82004 IEEE information and its implications for biometric privacy and security is considered. Biometric authentication is typically performed by a sophisticated software application, which manages the user interface and database, and interacts with a vendor specific, proprietary biometric algorithm. Algorithms undertake the following processing steps: 1) acquisition of a biometric sample image, 2) conversion of the sample image to a biometric template, 3) comparison of the new (or "live") template to previously stored templates, to calculate a match (or similarity) score [16] . High match scores indicate a likelihood that the corresponding images are from the same individual. The template is a (typically vendor specific) compact digital representation of the essential features of the sample image. Many vendors of biometric systems have claimed that it is impossible or infeasible to recreate the image from the templates (for example [4, 7] ). In light of this claim, biometric templates may be considered non-identifiable data, much like a password hash [IO] . Such biometric data can then be managed in ways that the source images cannot. For example, this assumed non-identifiability has been used to allay concerns expressed by citizens and employees that their fingerprint, face, and iris images may accessed from their storage on identification cards.
In fact, it is known that biometric templates are has shown that an estimate of the source image can be generated from biometric templates using a "hillclimbing" attack. This approach requires access to match score values for comparisons between an arbitrary image and the template of the target image. Beginning with a generic initial image, such an algorithm makes small modifications, and measures the resulting changes in the match score value. Modifications which increase the match score are retained, and, eventually, the modified image will resemble the unknown source image. In order to prevent such image regeneration, the authors of the BioAPI specification [5] recommend that match score values be quantized. Such quantization means that small changes to an image will normally not result in a change in the match score, preventing such a "hill-climbing'' attack [14] . The level of quantization plays an important role; a too-large spacing between quantization levels reduces the ability of application software to interpret the match-score data. This paper develops a modified "bill-climbing" attack which is able to overcome such quantization of match score values. Results are shown for templates calculated with a face recognition algorithm.
METHODS
A software application was implemented with the goal of regenerating a face image of a target (IM,arg).
Here, the target is defined as the person whose image IS to be regenerated. The application has access to a local database of face images, and has network access to a biometric application server [l] , in which the target template is stored. The software begins with only the identity of the target and the ability to obtain match scores (MS) of the target compared to an arbitrarily chosen image (IM). We represent this function as:
MS,= biometric-compare( IM, lMmrs )
In order to build such a software application, an attacker would require access to the target template, and the software to implement biometric-compare.
Hill-climbing algorithm
This section describes the hill-climbing algorithm for image regeneration using non-quantized match score data, based on the work of [21 and [141. 
Local database preparation:

RESULTS
Results in this paper were calculated using a commercially available face recognition software package. Initial tests with three other similar software systems show comparable results. Target and source images were chosen from the NIST Mugshot Database
[12], and U was calculated using the University of Aberdeen face recognition database [6] .
Since the match score values are specific to any biometric algorithm, they do not show the significance of a result. In order to interpret MS values, results are shown in terms of the confidence of a genuine match. We define the confidence to he the likelihood (in the Bayesian sense) that a comparison was genuine, given a match score MS was obtained. This statistic was estimated by performing comparisons between all possible genuine and impostor pairs of images in the database. For this algorithm, a quantization level of 1.0 corresponds to a maximum change in confidence of 10.6%.
The modified hill-climbing algorithm was applied to five different randomly selected source images at three different quantization levels: 1.0, 0.5 and 0.001. The latter level is effectively the same as no quantization.
Each run of the algorithm required 135,000 biometric comparisons, and took 122 minutes on a 2.8 GHz Pentium IV PC computer. The 100 lowest order eigenimages were used for image regeneration. Figure 1 shows a graph of confidence versus iteration number for a representative image at each quantization level. In all cases, the algorithm is able to significantly improve the image in terms of its similarity to IMtarg: The initial confidence was 0.229. Without quantization, the algorithm is able to quite rapidly achieve high confidence matches (0.998). As the quantization level increases the algorithm slows and achieves a poorer hest estimate (0.997 and 0.978 for quantization levels 0.5 and 1.0, respectively). However, even at the largest quantization level, the algorithm is able to produce an image which, in all cases, achieves a confidence above 95%. 
DISCUSSION
This paper considers one aspect of the, security and privacy implications of biometric data storage. Although some biometric algorithm vendors claim that an image of a person cannot he regenerated from a template, it has been shown that, in genera[, this can be accomplished using a "hill climbing attack [2, 14] . In order to defend against this attack, the BioAPI consortium [SI, recommended that biometric algorithms emir only quantized match scores.
In this paper, we show that it is still possible to regenerate biometric images even if the BioAPI recommendation is implemented. The test image is split into four quadrants, and each itaation of the hill climbing attack is applied to one quadrant at a time. Before each calculation, the image in the opposite quadrant is "made worse", such that the match score is just below tbe threshold: after the calculation, the opposite quadrant is returned to its previous condition, and the best modification retained. Thus, the image is modified such that the quantized match score pmvides useful information. This algorithm was tested for three different quantization levels, and shown to be able M successfully regenerate an image which verifies at a high confidence to the original. As the quantization level increased, the algorithm showed a clear increase in run time and decrease in maximum confidence obtained. With a quantization level corresponding to a 10.6% change in confidence, the calculated image would not be able successfully masquerade against a system with a False accept rate setting OF 1.0%. On the other hand, such a severe setting for the quantization level removes a significant amount of information from the calculated match score values. Furthermore, we anticipate that significant improvements are possible to this algorithm. First, only the lowest order 100 eigenimages were used, and the algorithm was stopped after 3000 iterations, We anticipate that increasing these limits will increase the maximum confidence at the expense of increased computation time. Secondly, the arbitrary division of the image into four quadrants, and the Use of Gaussian random noise for degradation may not he optimal.
We conclude that the quantization of match score values does not protect against the regeneration of images from stored biometric templates. This result has privacy and security implications For the storage and transmission of biometric data. including biometric templates and match score values.
